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We show that for infinite transition systems induced by cryptographic protocols in the Rusi-
nowitch/Turuani style with finite number of sessions, unbounded message size, and the Dolev-
Yao intruder certain fundamental branching properties are decidable. As a consequence, we
obtain that crucial properties of contract-signing protocols such as balance are decidable.
1 Introduction
Automatic analysis of cryptographic protocols has been studied intensively in the recent past (see,
e.g., [10, 14] for an overview) and has led to industrial-strength debugging tools (see, e.g., [2]). One
of the central results of the area is that the security of cryptographic protocols when analyzed w.r.t.
a finite number of sessions, without a bound on the message size, and in presence of the so-called
Dolev-Yao intruder is decidable (see, e.g., [16, 1, 5, 15]). This result (and all the related ones) is,
however, restricted to security properties such as authenticity and secrecy, which are reachability
properties of the transition system associated with a protocol: Is a state, in which the intruder
possesses a certain secret, such as a session key, reachable? In contrast, crucial properties required
of contract-signing and related protocols [12, 3, 4, 18], for instance abuse-freeness [12] and balance
[6], are properties of the structure of the transition system associated with a protocol. Balance, for
instance, requires that in no stage of a protocol run, the intruder (or a dishonest party) has both a
strategy to abort the run and a strategy to successfully complete the run and thus obtain a valid
contract.
The main goal of this paper is to show that the aforementioned result extends in a natural
way to branching properties, such as balance, and similar properties of contract-signing protocols.
In other words, the goal is to show that these branching properties are decidable w.r.t. a finite
number of sessions, without a bound on the message size, and in presence of the so-called Dolev-
Yao intruder. This can potentially lead to fully automatic analyzers for contract-signing protocols
that are much more precise than the existing ones (which consider only drastically scaled down
finite-state versions of the protocols in question).
The protocol and intruder model that we suggest to use is a “finite session” version of a model
proposed in [6];1it contains different features important for contract-signing protocols, which are
absent in the models for authentication and key exchange protocols referred to above. First, as in
1Our technical exposition though is closer to the term-rewriting approach [16] than to the multi-set rewriting
framework employed in [6] (see also [8]).
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[6], we include private contract signatures in our model as these signatures are used for instance in
the contract-signing protocol proposed in [12]. Second, as in [6], we model write-protected channels
which are not under the control of the intruder. In this paper, we call these channels secure channels
for simplicity, although this notion is also used in cryptography with a different meaning. Third,
for protocols in our model we explicitly define the induced transition systems. These transition
systems have infinitely many states and are infinitely branching, but have paths of bounded length,
and allow us to state crucial properties of contract-signing properties.
Our main technical result is that for the transition systems induced by a cryptographic protocol
properties expressing the existence of certain strategies for the intruder are decidable. We show
how to reduce balance to these properties. We also consider other important properties of contract-
signing protocols, namely effectiveness and fairness, and show that these properties can be reduced
to reachability properties slightly more general than those mentioned above. These properties are
also shown to be decidable.
The basic technique used in our proofs is the same as the one first introduced in [16], where they
show that to find an attack on a protocol only reasonably small substitutions have to be considered.
In our framework, we extend and modify this idea. We have to overcome the problem that in the
nature of a strategy there is a requirement that all possible counter-measures of an opponent have
to be taken into account, no matter how small or large the substitutions involved are.
In several papers, contract-signing and related protocols have been analyzed using finite-state
model checkers (see, e.g., [17, 13]). Due to the restriction to a finite state set, the Dolev-Yao
intruder is, however, only approximated. A much more detailed model has been considered by
Chadha et al. [6], who analyzed the contract-signing protocol proposed by Garay, Jakobsson, and
MacKenzie [12], even taking into account an unbounded number of sessions. However, the analysis
was carried out by hand and without tool support. As mentioned, our model is the “finite session”
version of the model by Chadha et al. (Allowing an unbounded number of sessions would render
the decision problems we consider undecidable.) Hence, our results show that when restricted to a
finite number of sessions, the analysis carried out in [6] can be fully automated (given a specification
of the protocols) without resorting to finite-state models as done in the works mentioned above.
Drielsma and Mödersheim [11] apply an automatic tool originally intended for authentication and
key exchange protocols in the analysis of the ASW protocol [3]. Their analysis is, however, restricted
to reachability properties as branching properties cannot be handled by their tool. Also, secure
channels are not modeled explicitly in that paper.
Structure of our paper. In Section 2 we introduce the protocol and intruder model, with an
example provided in Section 3. We then define the properties of induced transition systems we
show to be decidable and state decidability (Section 4). In Section 5, we show how the security
problems for concret security properties of contract-signing protocols can be reduced to the abstract
problems.
Full proofs of our results can be found in the appendix.
2 The Protocol and Intruder Model
As mentioned in the introduction, in essence, our model is the “finite session” version of the model
proposed in [6]. When it comes to the technical exposition, our approach is, however, inspired by
the term-rewriting approach of [16] rather than the multi-set rewriting approach of [6].
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In our model, a protocol is a finite set of principals and every principal is a finite tree, which
represents all possible behaviours of the principal. Each edge of such a tree is labelled by a rewrite
rule, which describes the receive-send action that is performed when the principal takes this edge
in a run of the protocol.
When a principal carries out a protocol, it traverses its tree, starting at the root. In every
node, the principal takes its current input, chooses one of the edges leaving the node, matches the
current input with the left-hand side of the rule the edge is labelled with, sends out the message
which is determined by the right-hand side of the rule, and moves to the node the chosen edge
leads to. Whether or not a principal gets an input and which input it gets is determined by the
intruder (or the secure channel, see below), who receives every message sent by a principal, can use
all the messages he has received to construct new messages, and can provide input messages to any
principal he wants—this is the usual Dolev-Yao model (see, e.g., [16]).
The above is very similar to the approach in [16]. There are, however, three important ingre-
dients that are not present in [16]: secure channels, private contract signatures, and an explicit
branching structure.
Secure channels. Unlike in the standard Dolev-Yao model, in our model the input of a principal
may not only come from the intruder but also from a so-called secure channel. While a secure
channel is not read-protected (the intruder can read the messages written onto this channel), the
intruder does not control this channel. That is, he cannot delay, duplicate, or remove messages, or
write messages onto this channel under a fake identity (unless he has corrupted a party).
Branching structure. As mentioned in the introduction, unlike authentication and key-exchange
protocols, properties of contract-signing and related protocols cannot be stated as reachability
properties, i.e., in terms of single runs of a protocol alone. One rather has to consider branching
properties. We therefore describe the behavior of a protocol as an infinite-state transition system
which comprises all runs of a protocol. To be able to express properties of contract-signing protocols
we distinguish several types of transitions: there are intruder transitions (just as in [16]), there are
ε-transitions, which can be used to model that a subprotocol is spawned without waiting for input
from the intruder, and secure channel transitions, which model communication via secure channels.
Since the intruder can construct an infinite number of messages, the transition system will have an
infinite number of states, but it will have paths of a bounded length.
2.1 Terms and Messages
We have a finite set V of variables, a finite set A of atoms, a finite set K of public and private
keys, an infinite set AI of intruder atoms, and a finite set N of principal addresses. All of them
are assumed to be disjoint.
The set K is partitioned into a set Kpub of public keys and a set Kpriv of private keys. There is
a bijective mapping ·−1 : K → K which assigns to every public key the corresponding private key
and to every private key its corresponding public key.
Typically, the set A contains names of principals, atomic symmetric keys, and nonces (i.e.,
random numbers generated by principals). We note that we will allow non-atomic symmetric keys
as well. The atoms in AI are the nonces, symmetric keys, etc. the intruder may generate. The
elements of N are used as addresses of principals in secure channels.
We define two kinds of terms by the following grammar: plain terms, which model (patterns
of) messages that are actually processed, and secure channel terms, which besides a plain message
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also contain a sender and a receiver address:
plain-terms ::= V | A | AI | 〈plain-terms, plain-terms〉 | {plain-terms}
s
plain-terms |





terms ::= plain-terms | sc(N ,N , plain-terms) | N
Plain terms, secure channel terms, and terms without variables (i.e., ground terms) are called
plain messages, secure channel messages, and messages, respectively. As usual, 〈t, t ′〉 is the pairing
of t and t′, the term {t}st′ stands for the symmetric encryption of t by t
′ (note that the key t′
may be any plain term), {t}ak is the asymmetric encryption of t by k, the term hash(t) stands
for the hash of t, and sigk(t) is the signature on t which can be verified with the public key k.
A term of the form PCSkO(t, kR, kT ) stands for the private contract signature on the contract
t computed using the private key kO
−1 corresponding to the public key kO. While it can be
verified by all principals (who know the public keys), only O, R, and T can tell who of O or
R actually computed the signature.2 Given PCSkO(t, kR, kT ), O and T (but not R) can turn
this private contract signature into a universally verifiable signature. More precisely, O can turn
PCSkO(t, kR, kT ) into ssigkO(t, kR, kT ) and T can turn PCSkO(t, kR, kT ) into tsigkO(t, kR, kT ) (this
models that T is accountable, since tsigkO(t, kR, kT ) is different from ssigkO(t, kR, kT )). Also, O can
generate a “fake” signature PCSfkR(t, kO, kT ) which by principals other than O, R, and T will be
recognized as valid. See [12, 6] for more details on private contract signatures.
A secure channel term of the form sc(n, n′, t) stands for feeding the secure channel from n to
n′ with t. A principal may only generate such a term if he knows n and t but not necessarily n ′.
This guarantees that a principal cannot impersonate other principals on the secure channel. Hence,
knowing n grants access to secure channels with sender address n.
Note that the above explanations are just to give some intuition on what these messages can
be used for and how they can be used. In our formel model, there will be no restriction on the
use of these messages in protocol descriptions except for the rules by which the intruder can derive
messages.
A substitution assigns terms to variables. The domain of a substitution is denoted by dom(σ)
and defined by dom(σ) = {x ∈ V | σ(x) 6= x}. Substitutions are required to have finite domains
and it is required that σ(x) is a ground term for each x ∈ dom(σ). Given two substitutions σ and
σ′ with disjoint domains, their union σ∪σ ′ is defined in the obvious way. Given a term t, the term
tσ is obtained from t by simultaneously substituting each variables x occurring in t by σ(x).
2.2 Principals and Protocols
Principal rules are of the form R ⇒ S where R is a term or ε and S is a term.
A principal Π = (V,E, r, `) is a finite tree rooted at r ∈ V where ` maps every edge (v, v ′) ∈ E
of Π to a principal rule `(v, v′) in such a way that every variable occurring on the right-hand side
of `(v, v′) also occurs on the left-hand side of `(v, v ′) or on the left-hand side of a principal rule on
the path from r to v. In other words, every variable occurring on the right-hand side of a principal





rule also occurs on the left-hand side of this or a preceeding principal rule. We call Π a rule tree if
the last restriction on the variables is not required to be satisfied.
For v ∈ V , we write Π↓v to denote the subtree of Π rooted at v. For a substitution σ, we write
Πσ for the principal obtained from Π by substituting all variables x occurring in the principal rules
of Π by σ(x).
A protocol P = ((Π1, . . . ,Πn), I) consists of a finite set of principals and a finite set I of
messages, the initial intruder knowledge. We require that each variable occurs in the rules of only
one principal, i.e., different principals must have disjoint sets of variables. We assume that intruder
atoms, i.e., elements of AI , do not occur in P .
2.3 Intruder
Given a set I of messages, the (infinite) set d(I) of messages the intruder can derive from I is the
smallest set satisfying the following conditions:
1. I ⊆ d(I).
2. Composition and decomposition: If m,m′ ∈ d(I), then 〈m,m′〉 ∈ d(I). Conversely, if
〈m,m′〉 ∈ d(I), then m ∈ d(I) and m′ ∈ d(I).
3. Symmetric encryption and decryption: If m,m′ ∈ d(I), then {m}sm′ ∈ d(I). Conversely, if
{m}sm′ ∈ d(I) and m
′ ∈ d(I), then m ∈ d(I).
4. Asymmetric encryption and decryption: If m ∈ d(I) and k ∈ d(I) ∩ K, then {m}ak ∈ d(I).
Conversely, if {m}ak ∈ d(I) and k
−1 ∈ d(I), then m ∈ d(I).
5. Hashing : If m ∈ d(I), then hash(m) ∈ d(I).
6. Signing : If m ∈ d(I), k−1 ∈ d(I) ∩ K, then sigk(m). (The signature contains the public key
but can only be generated if the corresponding private key is known.)
7. Private contract signature: If m ∈ d(I), k0
−1, k1, k2 ∈ d(I) ∩ K, then PCSk0(m, k1, k2).
8. Fake private contract signature: If m ∈ d(I), k0




9. Converting private contract signatures: If PCSk0(m, k1, k3) ∈ d(I) and k0
−1 ∈ d(I), then
ssigk0(m, k1, k3) ∈ d(I). Also, if PCSk0(m, k1, k3) ∈ d(I) and k3
−1 ∈ d(I), then
tsigk0(m, k1, k3) ∈ d(I).
10. Writing onto and read from the secure channel: If m ∈ d(I), n1 ∈ d(I) ∩ N , and n2 ∈ N ,
then sc(n1, n2,m) ∈ d(I). If sc(n1, n2,m) ∈ d(I), then m ∈ d(I).
11. Generating fresh constants: AI ⊆ d(I).
Each of the above rules only applies when the resulting expression is a term according to the
grammar stated above. For instance, a hash of a secure channel term is not a term, so rule 5 does
not apply when m is of the form sc(n, n′,m′).
Intuitively, n ∈ d(I) ∩ N means that the intruder has corrupted the principal with address
n and therefore can impersonate this principal when writing onto the secure channel. Also, the
intruder can extract m from sc(n, n′,m) since, just as in [6], the secure channel is not read-protected.
(However, our results hold independent of whether or not the secure channel is read-protected.)
2.4 The Transition Graph Induced by a Protocol
We define the transition graph GP induced by a protocol P and start with the definition of the
states and the transitions between these states.
A state is of the form ((Π1, . . . ,Πn), σ, I,S) where
1. σ is a substitution.
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2. For each i, Πi is a rule tree such that Πiσ is a principal.
3. I is a finite set of messages, the intruder knowledge.
4. S is a finite multi-set of secure channel messages, the secure channel.
The idea is that when the transition system gets to such a state, then the substitution σ has been
performed, the accumulated intruder knowledge is what can be derived from I, the secure channels
hold the messages in S, and for each i, Πi is the “remaining protocol” to be carried out by principal
i. This also explains why S is a multi-set: messages sent several times should be delivered several
times.
Given a protocol P = ((Π1, . . . ,Πn), I) the initial state of P is ((Π1, . . . ,Πn), σ, I, ∅) where σ
is the substitution with empty domain.
We have three kinds of transitions: intruder, secure channel, and ε-transitions. In what fol-










i) denote rule trees. We define under which
circumstances there is a transition
((Π1, . . . ,Πn), σ, I,S)
τ
−→ ((Π′1, . . . ,Π
′
n), σ
′, I ′,S ′)
with τ an appropriate label.
1. Intruder transitions: The above transition with label i,m, I exists if there exists v ∈ Vi with
(ri, v) ∈ Ei and `i(ri, v) = R ⇒ S, and a substitution σ
′′ of the variables in Rσ such that
(a) m ∈ d(I),
(b) σ′ = σ ∪ σ′′,
(c) Rσ′ = m,
(d) Π′j = Πj for every j 6= i, Π
′
i = Πi↓v,
(e) I ′ = I ∪ {Sσ′},
(f) S ′ = S if S 6= sc(·, ·, ·), and S ′ = S ∪ {Sσ′} otherwise.
This transition models that principal i reads the message m from the intruder (i.e., the public
network).
2. Secure channel transitions: The above transition with label i,m, sc exists if there exists v ∈ V i
with (ri, v) ∈ Ei and `i(ri, v) = R ⇒ S, and a substitution σ
′′ of the variables in Rσ such
that m ∈ S, (b)–(e) from 1., and S ′ = S \ {m} if S 6= sc(·, ·, ·), and S ′ = (S \ {m}) ∪ {Sσ′}
otherwise.
This transition models that principal i reads message m from the secure channel.
3. ε-transitions: The above transition with label i exists if there exists v ∈ Vi with (ri, v) ∈ Ei
and `i(ri, v) = ε ⇒ S such that σ
′ = σ and (d), (e), (f) from above.
This transition models that i performs a step where neither a message is read from the intruder
nor from the secure channel.
If q
τ
→ q′ is a transition where the first component of the label τ is i, then the transition is called
an i-transition and q′ an i-successor of q.
Given a protocol P , the transition graph GP induced by P is the tuple (SP , EP , qP ) where qP is
the initial state of P , SP is the set of states reachable from qP by a sequence of transitions, and EP
is the set of all transitions among states in SP . Formally, a transition q
τ
→ q′ is a tuple (q, τ, q′).
We write q ∈ GP if q is a state in GP and q
τ
→ q′ ∈ GP if q
τ
→ q′ is a transition in GP .
Remark 1. The transition graph GP of P is a DAG since by performing a transition the size of
the first component of a state decreases. While the graph may be infinite branching, the maximal
length of a path in this graph is bounded by the total number of edges in the principals Πi of P .
For a state q, we denote the subgraph of GP consisting of all states reachable from q by GP,q.
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3 Modelling the Originator of the ASW Protocol
To demonstrate that our framework can actually be used to analyze contract-signing protocols, we
show how the originator of the Asokan-Shoup-Waidner (ASW) protocol [3] can be modelled. In a
similar fashion, other contract-signing protocols, such as the Garay-Jakobsson-MacKenzie protocol
[12], can be dealt with.
3.1 Overview of the Protocol
Our informal description of the ASW protocol follows [17] (see this work or [3] for more details).
For ease in notation, we will write sig[m, k] instead of 〈m, sigk(m)〉.
The ASW protocol enables two principals O (originator) and R (responder) to obtain each
other’s commitment on a previously agreed contractual text, say text, with the help of a trusted
third party T , which, however, is only invoked in case of problems. In other words, the ASW
protocol is an optimistic two-party contract-signing protocol.
There are two kinds of valid contracts: the standard contract, 〈sig[mO, kO], NO, sig[mR, kR], NR〉,
and the replacement contract, sig[〈sig[mO, kO], sig[mR, kR]〉 , kT ], where mO = 〈kO, kR, kT , text,
hash(NO)〉, mR = 〈sig[mO, kO], hash(NR)〉, and kT is the key of the trusted third party. The
keys kO, kR, and kT are used for identifying the principals. Note that a signed contractual text
(sig[text, kO] or sig[text, kR]) is not considered a valid contract.
The ASW protocol consists of three subprotocols: the exchange, abort, and resolve protocol.
However, we can describe every principal—O, R, and T—in terms of a single tree as introduced in
Section 2.2.
The basic idea of the exchange protocol is that O first indicates his/her interest to sign the
contract. To this end, O hashes a nonce NO and signs it together with text and the keys of the
principals involved. The resulting message is the message sig[mO, kO] from above. By sending it
to R, O commits to the contract. Then, similarly, R indicates his/her interest to sign the contract
by hashing a nonce NR and signing it together with text and the keys of the involved principals.
This is the message mR from above. By sending it to O, R commits to the contract. Finally, first
O and then R reveal NO and NR, respectively. This is why a standard contract is only valid if NO
and NR are included.
If, after O has sent the first message, R does not respond, O may contact T to abort. At any
point, if one of O and R does not respond, the other may contact T to resolve. In case the protocol
is successfully resolved, the replacement contract sig[〈sig[mO, kO], sig[mR, kR]〉 , kT ] is issued. While
this version of the contract only contains the message indicating O’s and R’s intention to sign the
contract (and neither NO nor NR), the signature of T validates the contract.
In the next subsection, the model of O is presented. The models for R and T as well as the
security properties for the ASW protocol can be found in the Appendix A.
3.2 The Principal O
The principal O is defined by the tree ΠO depicted in Figure 1 where the numbers stand for the
principal rules defined below. Rules 1, 2, and 3 belong to the exchange protocol, rules 4, 5, and 6
belong to the abort protocol, and rules 7, 8, and 9 belong to the resolve protocol.










Figure 1: The Originator O
Abort protocol. If, after the first step of the exchange protocol, O does not get an answer back
from R, the principal O may start the abort protocol, i.e., send an abort request via a secure channel
to T (rule 4). Then, T will either confirm the abort of the protocol by returning an abort token—in
this case O will continue with rule 5—or send a resolve token—in this case O will continue with
rule 6. (The trusted third party T sends a resolve token if R previously contacted T to resolve the
protocol run.)
Resolve protocol. If after rule 2, i. e., after sending NO, the principal O does not get an answer
back from R, then O can start the resolve protocol by sending a resolve request to T via the secure
channel (rule 7). After that, depending on the answer returned from T (which again will return an
abort or resolve token), one of the rules 8 or 9 is performed.
We now present the principal rules for O where the numbering corresponds to the one in
Figure 1. Any occurrence of should be substituted by a new fresh variable, that is, the term
which is matched is not used afterwards.
1. ε ⇒ me1 where
me1 = sig[me2, kO] and me2 = 〈kO, kR, kT , text, hash(NO)〉 .
2. sig[me3, kR] ⇒ NO where me3 = 〈me1, hash(x)〉 .
3. x ⇒ OHasValidContract.
4. ε ⇒ sc(O, T,ma1) where ma1 = sig[〈aborted,me1〉 , kO].
5. sc(T,O,ma2) ⇒ OHasValidContract where
ma2 = sig[〈me1,me4〉 , kT ] and me4 = sig[〈me1, 〉 , kR].
6. sc(T,O, sig[〈aborted,ma1〉 , kT ]) ⇒ OHasAbortToken.
7. ε ⇒ sc(O, T, 〈me1, sig[me3, kR]〉).
8. sc(T,O, sig[〈aborted,ma1〉 , kT ]) ⇒ OHasAbortToken.
9. sc(T,O,mr1) ⇒ OHasValidContract where
mr1 = sig[〈me1,mr2〉 , kT ] and mr2 = sig[〈me1, 〉 , kR].
4 Abstract Properties and Decidability Results
In what follows, we formulate abstract properties of transition graphs that request the existence of
certain state or subgraphs (strategy graphs) and state decidability of these properties.
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The abstract properties are divided into reachability properties and strategy properties.
4.1 Reachability Properties









λi→ pi+1 ∈ EP for every i. We say that π is rooted if p0 = qP .
A reachability property is a tuple (C,C ′, θ) where C,C ′ ⊆ A∪K∪N and θ ∈ {2{1,...,n},noTrans}.
Elements in {1, . . . , n} denote the principals in P . Recall that these numbers are used as labels in
transitions of the transition graph.
A rooted path π as above (or the final state pl of this path) satisfies (C,C
′, θ) if the following
conditions are satisfied:
1. C ⊆ d(I) and C ′ ∩ d(I) = ∅ where I is the intruder’s knowledge in state pl, i.e., in state pl,
the intruder can derive all constants in C but cannot derive those in C ′.
2. If θ ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, then no outgoing secure channel or ε-transition of pl is labeled by one of
the principals in θ. (Secure channel and ε-transitions of other principals are allowed though
as well as arbitrary intruder transtions).
3. If θ = noTrans, then pl does not have outgoing transitions (of any kind).
Observe that θ = ∅ just means that we don’t care about which transitions leave the final state of
the path.
The abstract reachability problem Reachability asks, given a protocol P and a reachability
property (C,C ′, θ), whether there exists a rooted path in GP which satisfies (C,C
′, θ).
We note that the secrecy problem usually considered for authentication and key exchange pro-
tocols is an instance of the path problem where the path property is defined to be ({secret}, ∅, ∗)
for some fixed constant secret.
We show (see Appendix B):
Theorem 2. Reachability is decidable.
Similar to [16], to prove this theorem, we show how a given large path—a path with possibly large
substitutions—which satisfies the given reachability property can be reduced in size. While the
proof in [16] applies to reachability properties of the form (C,C ′, ∅) (except that in [16] no secure
channels or private contract signatures are considered), for properties where the last component
is not the empty set, we need to make sure that, when reducing the size of the large path, no
additional transitions are made applicable in the transition graph. Here we use that the intruder
can generate new constants.
4.2 Strategy Graphs and the Strategy Property
We first define strategy graphs and then define the strategy property.
The notion of a strategy graph captures that the intruder has a way of acting such that regardless
of how the other principals act, he achieves a certain goal, where goal in our context means that a
state will be reached where the intruder can derive certain constants and cannot derive others.
A q-strategy graph Gq is a sub transition system of GP where q is the initial state of Gq and




−→ q′′ ∈ GP , then q




−→ q′′ ∈ GP , then q




−→ q′′ ∈ Gq and q
′ j,m,I−→ q′′′ ∈ GP , then q
′ j,m,I−→ q′′′ ∈ Gq for every m, j, q
′′, and q′′′.
The first condition says that every ε-transition of the original transition system must be present
in the strategy graph; this is because the intruder should not be able to prevent a principal from
performing an ε-rule. The second condition is similar: the intruder should not be able to block the
secure channels. The third condition says that though the intruder can choose to send a particular
message to a particular principal, he cannot decide which transition this principal uses (if the
message matches two rules).
A strategy property is a tuple ((C1, C
′
1), . . . , (Cs, C
′
s)), where Ci, C
′
i ⊆ A ∪ K ∪ N . A state q
satisfies ((C1, C
′
1), . . . , (Cs, C
′
s)) if there exist q-strategy graphs G1, . . . ,Gs such that every Gi satisfies
(Ci, C
′
i), where Gi satisfies (Ci, C
′
i) if for all leaves vi of Gi all elements from Ci can be derived by
the intruder and all elements from C ′i cannot.
The abstract path problem Strategy asks, given a protocol P and a strategy property
((C1, C
′
1), . . . , (Cs, C
′
s)), whether there exists a state q that satisfies the property.
We show (Appendix B):
Theorem 3. Strategy is decidable.
To prove this theorem, we show that given a possibly large state q and large q-strategy graphs
satisfying the properties, we can reduce the size of the state and the strategy graphs, i.e., the
size of the substitutions in the state and the graphs. For this purpose, we need to deal with all
substitutions in all of the strategy graphs at the same time. The challenge is then to guarantee
that the reduced strategy graphs are in fact strategy graphs, i.e., satisfy the required conditions.
Also, we, again, make use of the fact that the intruder can generate new constants.
5 Properties of Contract-Signing Protocols
In this section, we formalize fundamental properties of contract-signing protocols, namely effec-
tiveness, fairness, and balance, in our model and explain why these properties are decidable in our
framework. The definition of these properties vary slighty from one paper to another (compare, for
instance, [6], [17], and [13]). For concreteness, we follow the definitions from [6].
In [6], as in most other works on the formal analysis of contract-signing protocols (see, however,
[7]), two-party optimistic contract-signing protocols have been studied. Beside the two parties (the
contractual partners), say A and B, who want to sign the contract, a trusted third party T is
involved in the protocol, and is consulted in case a problem occurs.
In order to be able to state the properties, we assume in what follows that the protocols
are modelled in the following way. If A finishes its protocol, it indicates this by writing the
message ATerminated into the network (i.e., adds it to the intruder’s knowledge). In case different
sessions of the protocol are considered, this message can contain details of the specific session.
Similarly, if A has a valid contract, it writes AHasValidContract into the network, and if A has
an abort token, it writes AHasAbortToken into the network. In many protocols, such as the ASW
protocol (see Section 3 and Appendix A), the message ATerminated is not needed since if A outputs
AHasValidContract or AHasAbortToken this also means that A terminated. We make analogous
assumptions for B.
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We now consider the different security properties. These properties are formulated under the
assumption that one of the contractual parties is dishonest and the other party is honest, i.e.,
follows the protocol. The actions of the dishonest party are performed by the intruder, and hence,
are arbitrary. The trusted third party is assumed to be honest. We denote the honest party by H;
all properties are formulated for H.
5.1 Effectiveness
The property effectiveness, as formulated in [6], can be divided into two subproperties, soundness
and termination.
According to [6], soundness means that there is a reachable state (in the transition graph GP
induced by the protocol P ) such that H has completed the protocol and has a valid contract.
Hence, in our model soundness asks whether there exists a state in GP in which the intruder can
derive HTerminated and HHasValidContract. This can be formulated as the reachability property
({HTerminated,HHasValidContract}, ∅, ∅), and thus, by Theorem 2 can be decided.
According to [6], termination means that for every state q in GP , there exists a state q
′ in GP
reachable from q only by actions of H and T such that H has completed the protocol and either has
a valid contract or an abort token. In other words, if a state is reached in which neither H nor T
can perform an action, then H must have either a valid contract or an abort token. In our model,
this means that for every state in GP without outgoing secure channels and ε-transitions of H and
T , the intruder can derive either HHasValidContract or HHasAbortToken. Hence, non-termination
holds iff (a path in) GP has reachability property (∅, {HHasValidContract,HHasAbortToken}, {H,T})
or reachability property ({HHasValidContract,HHasAbortToken}, ∅, {H,T}), and is thus decidable.
(The second property is only needed in case one wants to exclude that both HHasValidContract and
HHasAbortToken occur.) Recall that the names H and T in the third component of the reachability
properties stand for the principals as defined in the protocol. If the protocol description consists of
n principals, H and T are some numbers between 1 and n, namely, the numbers used in the labels
of the transitions.
A protocol is effective for H if it is sound and it terminates for H. By the above, this can be
decided based on the reachability problem.
5.2 Fairness
According to [6], a protocol is fair for H if for every reachable state q, the following conditions are
true:
1. If the intruder (and thus, the dishonest party) has a valid contract in q, then there exists a
state q′ reachable from q such that H has a valid contract in q ′.
2. If H has an abort token in q, then in each state q ′ reachable from q, the intruder does not
have a valid contract.
We will formulate the fact that a protocol is not fair (for H) in our model.
The first subproperty fails if there exists a state in GP without outgoing transitions and such
that H does not have a valid contract but the intruder (and thus, the dishonest party) has.
To formulate the fact that the intruder has a valid constract in our model, we add a principal
to the protocol description which on receiving a valid contract outputs IntruderHasValidContract.
(What a valid contract is depends on the particular protocol, and thus, the exact formulation
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of the new principal depends on the protocol. An example of such a prinicpal is presented in
Appendix A.4.)
Now, the fact that the first subproperty is not satisfied means in our model that there exists
a state without outgoing transitions and such that the intruder cannot derive HHasValidContract
but can derive IntruderHasValidContract. This can precisely be phrased as the reachability property
({IntruderHasValidContract}, {HHasValidContract},noTrans), and thus is decidable by Theorem 2.
The fact that the second subproperty is not satisfied means that there exists a state in GP where
H has an abort token and the intruder has a valid contract. Again using the new principal, in our
model this means that there exists a state in GP such that a state can be reached in which the
intruder can derive both HHasAbortToken and IntruderHasValidContract. This corresponds to the
reachability property ({HHasAbortToken, IntruderHasValidContract}, ∅, ∅), and thus, can be checked
automatically.
We note that the way fairness is formulated above (and in [6]) does not assume termination.
Hence, one could call this version of fairness partial fairness. Fairness defined in other papers
often also requires termination, and thus correspondends to the conjunction of partial fairness and
termination.
5.3 Balance
According to [6], balance means that there does not exist a state q in GP in which the intruder has
both the power to abort and the power to complete the protocol. The intruder has the power to abort
at state q if there exists a strategy graph such that H has an abort token in all leaves of this strategy
graph. The intruder has the power to complete at state q if there exists a strategy graph such that
H has a valid contract in all leaves of this strategy graph. Hence, in our model, a protocol P is not
balanced if P satisfies the strategy property (({HHasAbortToken}, ∅), ({HHasValidContract}, ∅)). By
Theorem 3, this can be decided.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have shown that effectiveness, fairness, and balance, a branching property of
contract-signing protocols, is decidable when there is no bound on the message size for a Dolev-Yao
intruder and when there are only a finite number of sessions. This extends known results on the
decidability of reachability problems for cryptographich protocols in a natural way. Our approach
is fairly generic; it should therefore be a good starting point for analyzing other game-theoretic
properties of cryptographic protocols. From a practical point of view, our result may also be a
good starting point for developing more precise analyzers for contract-signing protocols.
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A Modelling the Asokan-Shoup-Waidner Protocol
An informal description of the protocol as well as the formal model of the originator is in the main
part of this paper. We now state the models for the responder and the trusted third party, and
formulate security properties.
A.1 The Responder R
The principal R is given by the tree ΠR depicted in Figure 2 where the numbers stand for the






Figure 2: The Responder R
protocol. (Recall that the responder R has no abort protocol). In the exchange protocol, R
responds to O’s message sent in O’s exchange protocol. If after performing rule 1, O does not
return a message, R can launch the resolve protocol by sending a resolve request via a secure
channel to T (rule 3). As above, T will return one of two possible answers, namely, T will return
an abort or resolve token, which are handled by R using rules 4 and 5, respectively.
Descriptions of the principal rules follow.
1. me1 ⇒ me2 where
me1 = sig[〈kO, kR, kT , text, hash(x)〉 , kO],
me2 = sig[〈me1, hash(NR)〉 , kR].
2. x ⇒ 〈NR,RasValidContract〉.
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3. ε ⇒ sc(R, T, 〈me1,me2〉).
4. sc(T,R, sig[〈aborted,ma1〉 , kT ]) ⇒ RHasAbortToken where
ma1 = sig[〈aborted,me1〉 , kT ].
5. sc(T,R, sig[〈me1,me2〉 , kT ]) ⇒ RasValidContract.
A.2 The Trusted Third Party T
The trusted third party handles resolve and abort requests. Each such request involves two steps:
receiving the request and sending out a response (one rule). The different requests depend, however,
on each other. For instance, if the TTP receives an abort request for a protocol run between two
principals, then, after it has replied to it, the TTP will only allow a resolve request by the other
principal for the same protocol run. Moreover, this resolve request will be acknowledged by sending
an abort token. Similarly, if the TTP receives a resolve request, then, after it has replied to it, it
will only allow a request by the other principal (abort or resolve), but no further request by the
same principal. Moreover, this request will be acknowledged by a resolve token.
When, in the first situation, we assume that O is the principal sending the first request (abort),
we can model the behaviour of the TTP by the following two rules, where the tree is the one
involving the edges labeled 1 and 2 in Figure 3.
3Even though O only expects to obtain NR, R also indicates that it has a valid contract. Since this message is
sent to the intruder, the intruder could extract NR from it and send it to O. In any case, the intruder decides what






Figure 3: Partial Tree of the Trusted Third Party T
1. sc(O, T,ma1) ⇒ sc(T,O,ma2) where
ma1 = sig[〈aborted,me1〉 , kO],
me1 = sig[〈kO, kR, kT , x1, x2〉 , kO],
ma2 = sig[〈aborted,ma1〉 , kT ].
2. sc(R, T, 〈me1, sig[〈me1, 〉 , R]〉) ⇒ sc(T,R,ma1) with the same terms as above.
When, in the other situation, we assume that R is the principal sending the first request (resume),
we can model the behaviour of the TTP by the following three rules, where the tree is the one
involving the edges labeled 3, 4, and 5 in Figure 3.
3. sc(R, T,mr1) ⇒ sc(T,R,mr2) where
mr1 = 〈me1,me2〉 ,
me1 = sig[〈kR, kO, kT , x1, x2〉 , kR],
me2 = sig[〈me1, x3〉 , kR],
mr2 = sig[〈me1,me2〉 , kT ].
4. sc(O, T, sig[〈aborted,me1〉 , O]) ⇒ sc(T,O,mr2).
5. sc(O, T,mr1) ⇒ sc(T,O,mr2).
The complete model of T is now obtained by joining the two trees (as done in Figure 3) and adding
a copy of the resulting tree, but with the roles of O and R exchanged and the labels and variables
renamed.
This completes the description of our model of the ASW protocol.
A.3 Modelling issues
In the following, we discuss some of the modelling issues.
Authentication through secure channel. From the rules we use for T it is clear that in our model—
which follows [6] in this respect—the TTP makes use of the parameters of its secure channels in a
crucial way: T only accepts a request by O if this request is received on the secure channel from
O. In other words, T uses the channel for authentication purposes; it relies on the secure channel.
A different approach would be to stipulate that the protocol itself should provide evidence
for authenticity and not rely on the secure channel. We can change our model accordingly. For
instance, rule 1 of the intruder would then split into three different rules, each one of the form
sc(z, T,ma1) ⇒ sc(T, z,ma2)
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where
ma1 = sig[〈aborted,me1〉 , y],
me1 = sig[〈y, x1, T, x2, x3〉 , y],
ma2 = sig[〈aborted,ma1〉 , kT ].
To obtain the three rules one would have to replace z by any of the three possible principals, namely
O, R, and T .
Resources of the TTP. In the above model, T can handle only one protocol instance (session).
In case one wants it to handle more than one, one would have to have a model of the TTP that
incorporates several copies of T from above. Clearly, the TTP would have to keep track of the abort
tokens it has sent out, because it should not sent out a resolve token for the same session it has
issued an abort token earlier. In [6], this kind of book keeping is realized by a slight extension of
the protocol: each message in the protocol is augmented by a unique session id. In our framework,
this could be mimicked by adding a unique session constant to each message.
A.4 Formulating Security Goals of the ASW Protocol
In this section, we formulate the security goals of the ASW protocol as modeled in the previ-
ous sections. All of these security goals can be decided as shown in Section 5. For concretness,
we will consider the protocol P = ({ΠO,ΠT }, {R, kR, kR
−1, kO, kT , text, aborted}) with R ∈ N ,
kR, kR
−1, kO, kT ∈ K, and text, aborted ∈ A. That is, we assume O and T to be honest, i.e., they
follow their respective protocols. However, R is corrupted, and thus, R’s actions are performed by
the intruder, and hence, are arbitrary. Note that the intruder can impersonate R since he has R’s
private key kR
−1 and also the address R used as a sender for communication on a secure channel.
The security goals are formulated for honest O. This is done exactly as described in Secc-
tion 5. Since if O outputs OHasValidContract or OHasAbortToken, then this implies that O has
terminated, the message OTerminated is not needed. The additional principal needed to state
(partial) fairness for O is defined as follows. Recall that the purpose of this principal is to return
IntruderHasValidContract in case the intruder can derive a valid contract (for O and the agreed upon
contractual text). Formally, the tree defining the principal has two edges, which both originate from
the root. The principal rules labeling these edges are defined as follows:
1. valid1 ⇒ IntruderHasValidContract where
valid1 = 〈me1, x,me2, y〉 ,
me1 = sig[〈kO, kR, kT , text, hash(x)〉 , kO],
me2 = sig[〈me1, hash(y)〉 , kR].
2. valid2 ⇒ IntruderHasValidContract where
valid2 = sig[〈me1,me2〉 , kT ],
me1 = sig[〈kO, kR, kT , text, y〉 , kO],
me2 = sig[〈me1, z〉 , kR].
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B Deciding Reachability and Strategy Properties
In this section, we prove Theorem 2 and 3. For this purpose, we show some important properties
about the replacement of terms (Appendix B.1) and the derivation of messages by the intruder
(Appendix B.2) and then consider the path and strategy problem in Appendix B.3 and B.4.
By Sub(t) we denote the set of subterms of t. We define Sub(E) =
⋃
{Sub(t) | t ∈ E}. We
define Sub(P ) to be the set of subterms occurring in P and also add the sets A, K, and N .
B.1 Replacements
Let τ and τ ′ be terms. For a term t we denote by t|τ→τ ′ the term obtained from t by replacing
all occurrences of τ in t by τ ′. For a set of terms E we define E|τ→τ ′ = {t|τ→τ ′ | t ∈ E}. For a
substitution σ we define σ|τ→τ ′ to be the substitution with σ|τ→τ ′(x) = σ(x)|τ→τ ′ for all variables
x ∈ dom(σ). For a state p = ((Π1, . . . ,Πn), σ, I,S) we define
p|τ→τ ′ = ((Π1, . . . ,Πn), σ|τ→τ ′ , I|τ→τ ′ ,S|τ→τ ′).
For a substitution σ and terms t, t′, we say that t is a σ-match of t′ (t vσ t
′) if t is not a variable
and tσ = t′ (this notions was first introduced in [16]).
Obviously, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Let σ be a substitution, E be a set of terms, and τ be a message such that t 6vσ
τ for all t ∈ Sub(E). Then, for every a ∈ A ∪ K ∪ AI and for all t ∈ Sub(E), we have t(σ|τ→a) =
(tσ)|τ→a.
B.2 Derivations
We now prove some important properties about the derivation of messages by the intruder.
First, we characterize the set d(E) in terms of what we call intruder rules. The rules include the
same as those introduced in [16]. In addition, we need rules for hasing, signatures, private contract
signatures, and generating new atoms. In what follows, we often write E,m and m,m ′ instead of
E ∪ {m} and {m,m′}, respectively.
An intruder rule L is of the form E → m where E is a finite set of messages and m is a
message. A rule of this form is also called m-rule since m is generated. Given a set E ′, L can
be applied to E ′ if E ⊆ E′. The rule L induces a binary relation →L on finite sets of messages:
→L= {(E
′, E′∪{m}) | L can be applied to E ′}. If L is a set of intruder rules, then →L=
⋃
L∈L →L.
For a binary relation → we write E → E ′ instead of → (E,E ′). The reflexive and transitive closure
of → is denoted by →∗.
To describe d(E), we consider the following set of intruder rules. In what follows, the notion
“intruder rule” will always refers to the rules introduced below. This set is partitioned into decom-
position and composition rules. Accordingly, we call a rule decomposition and composition rule,
respectively.
Decomposition rules are of one of the following forms, where m and m′ are some messages and
k ∈ K (and thus, k−1 ∈ K):






Composition rules are of one of the following forms, where m,m′ are some messages, k, k0, k1, k2 ∈
K, n, n′ ∈ N , aI ∈ AI :
1. m,m′ → 〈m,m′〉.
2. m,m′ → {m}sm′ .
3. m, k → {m}ak.
4. m → hash(m).
5. m, k−1 → sigk(m).
6. m, k0
−1, k1, k2 → PCSk0(m, k1, k2).
7. m, k0, k1




8. PCSk0(m, k1, k2), k0
−1 → ssigk0(m, k1, k2) and PCSk0(m, k1, k2), k2
−1 → tsigk0(m, k1, k2).
9. m,n → sc(n, n′,m) (for some n′ ∈ N ).
10. → aI .
If L denotes the set of all (composition and decomposition) rules, then we obviously have that
d(E) =
⋃
{E′ | E →∗L E
′}.
A derivation is of the form E0 →L0 E1 →L1 E2 →L2 · · · →Ln−1 En where Ei →Li Ei+1 for
every i. We call n the length of the derivation. We know that for every m ∈ d(E) there exists
n, intruder rules L0, . . . , Ln−1, and sets E0, . . . , En such that E0 = E, m ∈ En, and there is a
derivation from E0 to En as above. We call such a derivation a derivation for m of length n. The
derivation is minimal if no step can be removed such that the resulting sequence is still a derivation
for m. Clearly, for every m ∈ d(E) there exists a minimal derivation. We write m ∈ dc(E) if there
exists a minimal derivation of m where the last rule is a composition rule. (Note that not for every
m ∈ d(E) such a derivation needs to exist.) We say that m ∈ dn(E) if there exists a (minimal)
derivation of m from E of length ≤ n. We write m ∈ dcn(E) to say that m ∈ d
c(E) and the minimal
derivation of m is of length ≤ n.
It has been proved in [16] for encryption that a a minimal derivation of m from E only contains
subterms of E and m, i.e., every rule only produces a subterm of E or m. This easily carries over
to our setting as well if with a public (private) key k, the set of subterms of a term also contains the
private (public) key k−1, and with a term ssigk0(m, k1, k2) or tsigk0(m, k1, k2) the set of subterms
also contains PCSk0(m, k1, k2). Extending the set of subterms in this way is necessary since, for
instance, to construct ssigk0(m, k1, k2) it may be necessary to first construct PCSk0(m, k1, k2) and
then convert this message into ssigk0(m, k1, k2). Now, given that to derive m from E only subterms
of m and E have to be considered, it is not hard to see that m ∈ d(E) can be decided in polynomial
time: One simply computes the closure of all subterms of m and E—of which there are only
polynomially many in the size of E and m—derivable from E (see, e.g., [9]). Hence, with Derive =
{(E,m) | m ∈ d(E)} where E and m are given as DAGs we have:
Lemma 5. Derive can be decided in polynomial time.
We now study which messages can be derived from a set of messages if certain terms are replaced
by other terms.
Lemma 6. Let E be a set of messages and τ, τ ′ be a message. Then, τ ∈ dc(E \ {τ}) implies that
τ ∈ d(E|τ→τ ′).
Proof. By induction on n we show that τ ∈ dcn(E \ {τ}) implies τ ∈ d(E|τ→τ ′).
n = 1: We have a derivation of the form E \ {τ} →L E \ {τ}, τ where L is a composition rule.
If L = m,m′ → 〈m,m′〉(= τ), then of course m,m′ ∈ E|τ→τ ′, and hence, τ ∈ d(E|τ→τ ′). The
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argument for the other composition rules, except for → aI , is the same. If τ ∈ AI , the statement
is obvious.
n → n + 1: Let E0 = E \ {τ} and E0 →L0 E1 →L1 · · · →Ln En+1 be a minimal derivation of τ
such that Ln is a composition rule. We know that τ 6∈ E1 (since otherwise the derivation would not
be minimal). Thus, τ ∈ dcn(E1 \ {τ}), and by induction, it follows τ ∈ d(E1|τ→τ ′). Assume that L0
is an m-rule. Hence, E1 = E0 ∪{m}, and thus, E1|τ→τ ′ = E0|τ→τ ′ ∪{m|τ→τ ′}. If we can show that
m|τ→τ ′ ∈ d(E0|τ→τ ′), then we immediately obtain that τ ∈ d(E0|τ→τ ′), which concludes our proof.
To show that m|τ→τ ′ ∈ d(E0|τ→τ ′), we distinguish different cases. Note that m 6= τ and τ /∈ E0.
1. Assume that L0 = m
′,m′′ → 〈m′,m′′〉. Then, m′|τ→τ ′ ,m
′′
|τ→τ ′ ∈ E0|τ→τ ′ , and thus,




|τ→τ ′〉 ∈ d(E0|τ→τ ′). A similar argument works for the other com-
position rules. For PCSk0(m, k1, k2), k0
−1 → ssigk0(m, k1, k2) and PCSk0(m, k1, k2), k2
−1 →
tsigk0(m, k1, k2) we use that τ 6= PCSk0(m, k1, k2). For → aI , we use that τ 6= aI .
2. Assume that L0 = 〈m,m
′〉 → m. We have 〈m,m′〉|τ→τ ′ = 〈m|τ→τ ′ ,m
′
|τ→τ ′〉 because
〈m,m′〉 6= τ , . Hence, m|τ→τ ′ ∈ d(E0 |τ→τ ′). The argument for the other decomposition
rules is similar. 2
We use this lemma to prove:
Lemma 7. Let E be a set of messages and τ, τ ′ be messages. Then, τ ∈ dc(E \ {τ}) implies
d(E)|τ→τ ′ ⊆ d(E|τ→τ ′ ∪ {τ
′}).
Proof. By induction on n we show that with τ ∈ dc(E \ {τ}) it follows for every m ∈ dn(E) that
m|τ→τ ′ ∈ d(E|τ→τ ′ ∪ {τ
′}). For n = 0 this is obvious. For the induction step (n → n + 1) assume
that E = E0 →L0 E1 →L1 · · · →Ln En+1 is a minimal derivation of m. It is easy to see that
m ∈ dn(E1) and τ ∈ d
c(E1 \ {τ}). Induction yields that m|τ→τ ′ ∈ d(E1|τ→τ ′ ∪ {τ
′}). Assume that
L0 is an m
′-rule. Hence, E1 = E0 ∪ {m
′} and E1|τ→τ ′ = E0|τ→τ ′ ∪ {m
′
|τ→τ ′}. If we can show that
m′|τ→τ ′ ∈ d(E0|τ→τ ′ ∪ {τ
′}), we are done. We distinguish different cases.
1. Assume that L0 = m
′′,m′′′ → 〈m′′,m′′′〉(= m′). If 〈m′′,m′′′〉 = τ , then we have of course
〈m′′,m′′′〉|τ→τ ′ ∈ d(E0|τ→τ ′ ∪ {τ







|τ→τ ′〉 ∈ d(E0 |τ→τ ′ ∪ {τ
′}). If L0 =→ aI , the argument is obvious.
Analogously, one can show the statment for all other composition rules except for the rule
PCSk0(m
′′, k1, k2), k0
−1 → ssigk0(m
′′, k1, k2) and PCSk0(m




′′, k1, k2) = τ . However, by assumption, and Lemma 6, we know that τ ∈
d(E0|τ→τ ′). Thus, m
′ = ssigk0(m
′′, k1, k2) ∈ d(E0|τ→τ ′) (m
′ = tsigk0(m
′′, k1, k2) ∈ d(E0|τ→τ ′)).
Since τ 6= m′, we have m′|τ→τ ′ = m
′. Hence, m′|τ→τ ′ ∈ d(E0|τ→τ ′ ∪ {τ
′}).
2. Assume that L0 = 〈m
′,m′′〉 → m′. If 〈m′,m′′〉 = τ , then τ ∈ d(E0|τ→τ ′) by Lemma 6. Hence,
m′|τ→τ ′ = m
′ ∈ d(E0|τ→τ ′). If 〈m
′,m′′〉 6= τ , then 〈m′|τ→τ ′ ,m
′′
|τ→τ ′〉 ∈ E0|τ→τ ′ , and thus,
m′|τ→τ ′ ∈ d(E0|τ→τ ′). The argument for the other decomposition rules is similar. 2
B.3 Deciding the Reachability Problem
The key to show that the reachability problem is decidable is the following lemma. It says that
given a rooted path π in the transition graph GP such that the substitution σ in the final state of this
path (note that this substitution extends all other substitutions in states of the path) is not built
from subterms of the protocol, one can construct another rooted path π ′ in GP which has the same
properties as π w.r.t. reachability properties as defined in Section 4.1 and in which the substitution
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is build only from subterms of the protocol. Formally, a subsitution σ is built from subterms of
the protocol if for every x there exists t ∈ Sub(P )∪AI such that t vσ σ(x). This lemma extends a
lemma proved in [16], which was restricted to a setting without (private contract) signatures, secure
channels, and the ability of the intruder to generate new atoms, and more importantly, in [16] only
secrecy properties rather than the more general reachability properties have been considered.
Our lemma is stated slightly more generally than explained above. We show that for every
message τ such that t 6vσ τ for every t ∈ Sub(P )∪AI , there exists a path with the same reachability
properties as the previous path where every occurrence of τ is replaced by a new constant, and
thus, in this path the substitutions do not contain τ . This more general version of the lemma is
also needed in the following section. Note that if a subsitution is not built from subterms of the
protocol, i.e., there exists x such that t 6vσ σ(x) for every t ∈ Sub(P ) ∪AI , then using the lemma
and setting τ = σ(x), we can find a path with a substitution where t vσ σ(x) for some t ∈ AI .
Hence, by repeated application of the lemma, we can turn the substitution into one that is built





λ2→ · · ·
λl−1
→ pl
be a rooted path in GP where
pj = ((Π
j
1, . . . ,Π
j
n), σj , Ij ,Sj).
Let τ be some message such that t 6vσl τ for all t ∈ Sub(P ) ∪ AI . Furthermore, let aI ∈ AI be a


















λj if λj is an ε-transition,
(i,m′, I) if λj = (i,m, I) with m
′ = m|τ→aI ,
(i,m′, sc) if λj = (i,m, sc) with m
′ = m|τ→aI .
Then, all of the following is true:
1) π′ is a rooted path in GP .
2) For all atoms c ∈ A∪N ∪K we have c ∈ d(Il) iff c ∈ d(I
′
l).
3) If there is no intruder transition in GP (for principal i) originating from pl, then there is no
intruder transition in GP (for principal i) originating from p′l.
4) If there is no secure channel transition in GP (for principal i) originating from pl, then there
is no secure channel transition in GP (for principal i) originating from p
′
l.
5) If there is no ε-transition in GP (for principal i) originating from pl, then there is no ε-
transition in GP (for principal i) originating from p
′
l.
Proof. First, assume that τ does not occur as a subterm anywhere in π. Then, π ′ = π and
nothing is to show. In what follows, we show the properties claimed for π ′ under the assumption
that τ occurs in π.
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1) We call (*) the property of τ that t 6vσl τ for all t ∈ Sub(P ) ∪AI . Let
R0 ⇒ S0, . . . , Rl−1 ⇒ Sl−1
be the sequence of principal rules applied in the transitions of the path. We know that τ is not a
subterm of I0 or some of the principal rules of the principals because of (*). But then, there must
exist a j such that τ is a subterm of Rjσl or Sjσl. Because of (*) it follows that there exists x in
the domain of σl (and in Rj or Sj) such that τ is a subterm of σl(x). By definition of principals, if
a variable occurs on the right-hand side of some principal rule, then it also occurs on the left-hand
of some preceeding rule. Therefore, there exists i such that x occurs in Ri. In particular, there
exists q such that τ is a subterm of Rqσl(= Rqσq+1). We choose q minimal with this property, i.e.,
τ is not a subterm in Rjσl for some j < q. We prove the following statements:
a) λq is an intruder transition.
Suppose λq is a secure channel transition. Then there is u < q such that Rqσq+1 = Suσu =
sc(n1, n2,m) ∈ Sq. It follows that τ is a subterm of Suσu. Because of (*) it follows that τ
occurs as a subterm in σu(y) for some variable y. By the definition of principals, it follows
that y occurs in some Ri for i ≤ u. Thus, τ is a subterm of Riσu in contradiction to the
definition of q. Hence, λq cannot be a secure channel transition.
Trivially, the transition λq can not be an ε-transition since in this case Rq = ε.
b) τ 6∈ Sub(Iq).
The argument is similar to the above.
c) τ ∈ dc(Iq).
We first show that τ ∈ d(Iq). We have Rqσq+1 ∈ d(Iq), because λq is an intruder transition.
Let E0 = Iq and
E0 →L0 E1 →L1 · · · →Ln−1 En.
be a minimal derivation of Rqσq+1 from E0. In particular, Rqσq+1 ∈ En. We want to show
that τ ∈ En. Suppose τ 6∈ En. There exists a minimal j ≥ 0 such that τ ∈ Sub(Ej) since
τ ∈ Sub(Rqσq+1). We know that j > 0 since τ 6∈ Sub(Iq). We distinguish between the
following cases:
– Lj−1 is a composition rule which generates m, and thus, τ ∈ Sub(m) and τ 6= m. By
the definition of composition rules, it is easy to check that then τ ∈ Sub(Ej−1), in
contradiction to the choice of j.
– Lj−1 is a decomposition rule which generates m, and thus, τ ∈ Sub(m) and τ 6= m.
Then, by the definition of decomposition rules, we can conclude that τ ∈ Sub(Ej−1), in
contradiction to the choice of j.
This implies that τ ∈ d(Iq). Furthermore, using that τ 6∈ Sub(Iq) we can conclude that
τ ∈ dc(Iq).






2→ · · ·
λ′
l−1
→ p′l is a path in GP . We have to show that all steps in π
′ are
indeed transitions. We show the following statement by induction on j: For all 0 ≤ j ≤ l − 1
we have that p′j and p
′
j+1 are states in GP and λ
′
j is a transition between them.
j = 0: Of course we have p′0 = p0. If q > 0 then p
′
1 = p1 and λ
′
1 = λ1, and thus, we are done.
If q = 0, we know that λ0 is an intruder transition and
R0σ1 ∈ d(I0),
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and we know by Lemma 4 that
R0σ
′
1 = R0(σ1|τ→aI ) = (R0σ1)|τ→aI





0) by Lemma 7.
j → j + 1: We distinguish different cases depending on the type of λj+1.
– λj+1 is an ε-transition: If λj+1 =
i
−→ then there is an applicable rule in Πj+1i of the
form ε ⇒ Sj+1. The principals in p
′
j+1 are the same as in pj+1 so the same ε-rule
ε ⇒ Sj+1 is applicable in p
′
j+1. The substitution in pj+2 is the same as in pj+1 so
the substitutions in p′j+2 and p
′
j+1 are the same, too. Since by Lemma 4 we have
Sj+1σ
′
j+2 = Sj+1(σj+1|τ→aI ) = (Sj+1σj+1)|τ→aI the application of ε ⇒ Sj+1 leads to
p′j+2.
– λj+1 is an intruder transition: We know that Rj+1σj+2 ∈ d(Ij+1) and we know that
Rj+1σ
′
j+2 = Rj+1(σj+2|τ→aI ) = (Rj+1σj+2)|τ→aI









m|τ→aI = Rj+1σj+2|τ→aI = Rj+1(σj+2|τ→aI )





2) The implication from left to right, follows from Lemma 7 with E = Il and τ
′ = aI . The
implication in the other direction, follows from Lemma 7 if we set E to be I ′l , τ (from Lemma 7)
to be aI , and τ
′ to be τ (from the lemma proved here).
3) We show that there is an intruder transition originating from pl (for principal i) if there is an
intruder transition originating from p′l (for principal i).




−→ p′ is a transition in GP , where p
′ = ({Π′}, σ′, I ′,S ′). Let
R ⇒ S be the principle rule for this transition. Then we know that σ ′ is an extension of σl|τ→aI
to dom(σl|τ→aI ) ∪ V(R) such that Rσ
′ ∈ d(I ′l). Now we show that there is an intruder transition
from pl in GP . Let σ = σ
′
|aI→τ . We only need to show that σ is an extension of σl and Rσ ∈ d(Il).
Since aI does not occur in σl the substitution σ is an extension of σl and we know by Lemma 7
that
Rσ = R(σ′|aI→τ ) = (Rσ
′)|aI→τ ∈ d(Il|τ→aI )|aI→τ
⊆ d((Il |τ→aI )|aI→τ
∪ {τ}) = d(Il ∪ {τ}) = d(Il).
This shows that there is an outgoing intruder transition from pl (for principal i) in GP .
4) We show that there is a secure channel transition in GP (for principal i) originating from pl if
there is a secure channel transition in GP (for principal i) originating from p
′
l.




−→ p′ is a transition in GP , where p
′ = ({Π′}, σ′, I ′,S ′). Let
R ⇒ S be the principle rule for this transition. Then we know that σ ′ is an extension of σl|τ→aI
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to dom(σl|τ→aI ) ∪ V(R) such that m
′ ∈ S ′l . Now we show that there is a secure channel transition
from pl in GP . Let σ = σ
′
|aI→τ . We only need to show that σ is an extension of σl and Rσ ∈ Sl.
Since aI does not occur in σ the substitution σ is an extension of σl. We know that m
′
|aI→τ ∈ Sl
and by Lemma 7 we have




So there is an outgoing secure channel transition (for principal i) from pl in GP .
5) This is obvious as the principals in p′l and pl are the same. 2
As explained above, as a corollary of this lemma we obtain:
Corollary 9. If π is a rooted path in GP which satisfies the reachability property (C,C
′, θ), then
there exists a rooted path π′ in GP such that π
′ satisfies (C,C ′, θ) and for the substitution σ′ in the
final state of π′ we have that for every x in the domain of π ′ there exists t ∈ Sub(P )∪AI such that
t vσ′ σ
′(x).
It has been shown in [16] that a substitution which can be built from subterms of a protocol P ,
i.e., a substitution such as σ′ in the above corollary, can be represented as a DAG of size polynomial
in the size of the protocol P (i.e., the number of subterms occurring in P and the number of nodes in
the principals of P ). However, since in our setting subsitutions may contain atoms from the infinite
set AI , bounding the size of subsitutions still allows an infinite number of possible substitutions.
But it is clear that the number of different atoms from AI we need to consider can be bounded by
the DAG size of the substitution as well. Hence, we can simply take some fixed set of p(|P |) atoms
where p(·) is the polynomial that bounds the size of the substitution.
From this and Lemma 5 it is now easy to see that the reachability problem can be decided
by the following algorithm: Given a reachability property (C,C ′, ∅), the algorithm works in three
steps. It first guesses a “symbolic” path through GP starting from the initial state. Second, it
guessses a substitution of size polynomially bounded in the size of the protocol. Finally, it checks
if the path guessed is actually a path in GP and if the given reachability property is satisfied when
substituting all variables in the path according to the guessed substitution. In what follows, the
steps are further explain:
1. The algorithm guesses a symbolic path πs—a path where the subsitution is not determined
yet—through GP starting from the initial state of GP by guessing transitions until it non-
deterministically decides not to extend the path anymore or no principals rules are left.
(Recall that the length of such a path is bounded by the number of principal rules occurring
in the protocol.) A transition is guessed as follows: First, one edge originating at the root of
some principal (if any) is chosen. Say the edge is labeled R ⇒ S and the principal is i. In
case R = ε, the algorithm extends the current path by an ε-transition labeled i and writes
S into the intruder knowledge and if S is a secure channel term also into the secure channel.
This determines the new “symbolic” state. Clearly, principal i is also updated according to
the edge that was chosen. In case R 6= ε, the algorithm guesses whether the input should
come from the intruder or whether it should come from the secure channel. In the former
case, the transition is labeled (i, R, I) and in the latter case (i, R, sc). In case the transition is
determined to be a secure channel transition, the algorithm also guesses which of the secure
channel terms, say S ′, in the secure channel will be read in order to apply the transition.
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Since the substitution is not determined yet, the terms may have variables. Now, once the
transition is guessed, the new state is obtained as in the case of ε-transitions.
2. Guess a subsitution σ of the variables occurring in πs of size polynomially bounded in the
size of P .
3. Check that a) πsσ—the path obtained from πs when substituting the variables according to
σ—is in fact a path in GP and that b) πsσ satisfies the given reachability property.
(a) We need to check whether the transitions can actually be applied. By construction of
πs, ε-transitions can be applied. A secure channel transition say with label (i, Rσ, sc)
can be applied if Rσ coincides with the term S ′σ (the term determined to be read from
the secure channel). An intruder transition can be applied if Rσ ∈ d(Iσ) where I is
the current knowledge of the intruder in the symbolic state, and hence, Iσ is the actual
knowledge of the intruder in the current state. By Lemma 5, we can decide Rσ ∈ d(Iσ)
in deterministic polynomial time in the size of P .
(b) Assume that Iσ is the current knowledge of the intruder.
i. By Lemma 5, we can decide c ∈ d(Iσ) for every c ∈ C and c′ /∈ d(Iσ) for every c′ ∈
C ′ in deterministic polynomial time in the size of P and the reachability property.
ii. It is obvious how to decide (in polynomial time) whether or not the current state
has an outgoing ε-transition.
iii. As for secure channel transitions, we only need to check whether there exists an edge
originating from a root of a tree describing some principal—the number of such edges
is linearly bounded in the size of the protocol—labeled say with R ⇒ S such that
Rσ matches with some secure channel message in the secure channel. Note that Rσ
may contain variables since there may be new variables in R not subsitutionted by
σ yet. Clearly, this can be decided in polynomial time.
iv. Similarly, to decide whether the current state has an outgoing intruder transition,
we check whether there exists an edge as above labeled say with R ⇒ S such that
there exists a substitution σ′ of the variables in Rσ such that (Rσ)σ ′ ∈ d(Iσ). This
problem is obviously equivalent to the following problem: Let P ′ be a protocol which
consists of one principal which has only one edge labeled with Rσ ⇒ secret where
secret is some new atom added to A. The initial intruder knowledge of P ′ is Iσ.
We ask whether there exists a path in GP ′ which satisfies ({secret}, ∅, ∅). From the
above we know that the algorithm consisting of the steps 1. to 3.,(b),i decides this
problem.
It follows Theorem 2. Similar as in [16], we obtain that the reachability problem is NP-hard.
Also, when restricted to reachability properties of the form (C,C ′, ∅), the above algorithm is a
non-deterministic polynomial time algorithm. For more general reachability properties we need to
decide the presence or absense of intruder transitions, which can be done in coNP, since as shown
above, this problem can be reduced to the question whether in a given protocol there is no path
which satisfies ({secret}, ∅, ∅). Thus, Reachability is in NP coNP .
B.4 Deciding the Strategy Problem
The goal of this section is to prove Theorem 3. The basic idea is similar to the decidability of the
reachability problem: Given a sequence of strategy graphs which satisfies the given strategy prop-
erty we show that we can turn these graphs into strategy graphs where in addition all subsitutions
are built from subterms of terms occurring in the protocol. However, there is a crucial different:
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For the reachability problem we have shown that we can find a path such that for the substitution
σ of this path (i.e., the substitution in the final state of this path) we have that for every variable x
in the domain of σ there exists t ∈ Sub(P )∪AI such that t vσ σ(x). For the strategy problem, we
only require that for every leaf e in the (union of the) strategy graphs and every substitution σe in
such a leaf and every variable x in the domain of σe there exists t ∈ Sub(P )∪AI and a substitution
σe′ in a possibly different leaf e
′ such that t vσ
e′
σe(x). In the follow lemma, we show that if there
is one leaf e such that its substitution σe does not fulfill this property, i.e., there exists x in the
domain of σe such that for no e
′ and no t ∈ Sub(P ) ∪ AI we have t vσe′ σe(x), then σe(x) can be
replaced in all strategy graphs by a new atom aI ∈ AI . Repeated application of this lemma thus
yields a strategy graphs with subsitutions of the desired form. Before we can state the lemma, we
need some notation.
For a subgraph G = (S,E, p) of GP and messages τ and τ
′ we denote by G|τ→τ ′ the tuple
(S|τ→τ ′ , E|τ→τ ′ , p|τ→τ ′). Here S|τ→τ ′ is the set consisting of all q|τ→τ ′ where q ∈ S. The set E
consists of all transitions of the form p|τ→τ ′
λ|τ→τ ′
−→ p′|τ→τ ′ , for p
λ






λ if λ is an ε-transition,
(i,m′, I) if λ = (i,m, I) with m′ = m|τ→τ ′,
(i,m′, sc) if λ = (i,m, sc) with m′ = m|τ→τ ′.
For subgraphs G1, . . . ,Gs of GP with G
i = (Si, Ei, q), we denote by G
1 ∪ · · · ∪ Gs the union of G1 to
Gs, i.e., the tuple (S1 ∪ · · · ∪ Ss, E1 ∪ · · · ∪ Es, q).
Lemma 10. Let P be a protocol and κ = ((C1, C
′
1), . . . , (Cs, C
′
s)) be a strategy property. Let
G1, . . . ,Gs be q-strategy graphs of GP such that they satisfy κ. Let e = ((Π1, . . . ,Πn), σe, Ie,Se) be
a leaf of G1 ∪ · · · ∪ Gs and x be a variable such that
i) x is in the domain of σe(x) and
ii) for all t ∈ Sub(P ) ∪AI and all leafs e
′ of G1 ∪ · · · ∪ Gs we have t 6vσ
e′
σe(x) where σe′ is the
substitution of e′.
Let aI ∈ AI be an intruder atom that does not occur in G
1 ∪ · · · ∪ Gs and P . Then,




Proof. In what follows, define τ = σe(x). We have to prove the following:
1) q|τ→aI is a state in GP ,
2) Gi|τ→aI is a subgraph of GP for all i = 1, . . . , s,
3) Gi|τ→aI satisfies the strategy graph conditions for all i = 1, . . . , s,
4) Ci ⊆ d(Ie′) and C
′
i ∩ d(Ie′) = ∅ for all i = 1, . . . , s and all leafs e
′ of Gi|τ→aI .
In what follows, we prove the above statements.
1) Since q = ((Π1, . . . ,Πs), σ, I,S) lies on a path from the root of GP to e we know by Lemma 8
that q|τ→aI is a state in GP . Note that the preconditions of this lemma are satisfied.
2) This easily follows from Lemma 8.
4) We know that every path from q to a leaf in G i satisfies the reachability property (Ci, C
′
i, ∅). By
Lemma 8, this carries over to the paths of G i|τ→aI .
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3) We have to show that for i = 1, . . . , s the graph G i|τ→aI is a strategy graph, that is, for all states
p|τ→aI ∈ G
i
|τ→aI we have to show the following conditions. Let p = ((Π1, . . . ,Πn), σ, I,S). (Recall
that p|τ→aI is obtained from this state by replacing every occurrence of τ by aI .)
– If p|τ→aI
j
−→ p′ ∈ GP , then p|τ→aI
j
−→ p′ ∈ Gi|τ→aI for every j.
Proof. Let p′ = ((Π′1, . . . ,Π
′
n), σ
′, I ′,S ′) ∈ GP such that p|τ→aI
j
−→ p′ ∈ GP . Let ε ⇒ S be
the principal rule applied in the principal j. Because the principals in p|τ→aI and p are the
same this rule is also applicable in p, and because G i is a strategy graph there is a transition
p
j
−→ p′′ ∈ Gi involving this rule. There is a leaf in G i reachable by a rooted path in GP
through q, p, and p′′. The subsitution of such a leaf extends σ. Now, by property ii) and
Lemma 4, we can conclude that S(σ|τ→aI ) = (Sσ)|τ→aI . Hence, p
′ = p′′|τ→aI , and thus, the
transition p|τ→aI
j
−→ p′ is present in Gi|τ→aI .
– If p|τ→aI
j,m,sc
−→ p′ ∈ GP , then p|τ→aI
j,m,sc
−→ p′ ∈ Gi|τ→aI for every m and j.
Proof. Let p|τ→aI
j,m,sc
−→ p′ ∈ GP where p
′ = ((Π′1, . . . ,Π
′
n), σ
′, I ′,S ′). Let R ⇒ S be the
principal rule applied in this transition. Then σ ′ is an extension of σ|τ→aI to dom(σ|τ→aI ) ∪
V(R) and we have m = Rσ′ ∈ S|τ→aI . Since the intruder atom aI does not occur in any
of the strategy graphs or in P , and in particular, in any of the messages of S, we have
m|aI→τ ∈ (S|τ→aI )|aI→τ
= S. The substitution σ′|aI→τ is an extension of σ to dom(σ)∪V(R),





So the rule R ⇒ S can be applied in state p and we have p
j,m|aI→τ
,sc









′′,S ′′). We now have to show that for the message S(σ ′|aI→τ ),
which is sent in this transition, we have (S(σ ′|aI→τ ))|τ→aI
= Sσ′, and that (m|aI→τ )|τ→aI
=
(R(σ′|aI→τ ))|τ→aI
= m, since then p′ = p1|τ→aI and p|τ→aI
j,m,sc
−→ p′ ∈ Gi|τ→aI .
There is a leaf in Gi reachable by a rooted path in GP through q, p, and p1. The substitution
of such a leaf extends σ′|aI→τ . Now, by property ii) and Lemma 4, we can conclude that
(S(σ′|aI→τ ))|τ→aI






























−→ q1 ∈ GP where q1 =




It suffices to show that there is a p1 ∈ GP such that
– p1|τ→aI = q1 and
– p
j,m,I
−→ p1 ∈ GP .
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Let R ⇒ S be the principle rule that was applied for the above transition from p|τ→aI to
q1. Then σ
1 is an extension of σ|τ→aI to dom(σ|τ→aI ) ∪ V(R). Consequently, σ
1
|aI→τ is an
extension of σ to dom(σ) ∪ V(R). We know that
R(σ1|aI→τ ) = (Rσ
1)|aI→τ = (m|τ→aI )|aI→τ
= m.
Hence, the rule R ⇒ S can be applied in state p, and since G i is a strategy graph and p
j,m,I
−→
p′ ∈ Gi, the rule will be applied. Let the resulting state be p1. To show that p1|τ→aI = q1 it
suffices to show that (S(σ1 |aI→τ ))|τ→aI
= Sσ1. Here we apply the same argument as in the
case of secure channel transitions above. 2
Using this lemma, we obtain:
Lemma 11. Let P be a protocol and κ = ((C1, C
′
1), . . . , (Cs, C
′
s)) be a strategy property such that
P satisfies κ. Then, there exists a state q in GP and q-strategy graphs G
1, . . . ,Gs such that the
following is true (for every i = 1, . . . , s):
1. Gi satisfies (Ci, C
′
i) and for every state in G
i, the number of its outgoing intruder, secure
channel, and ε-transitions is bounded by the size of P , respectively.
2. For every leaf e in G1 ∪ · · · ∪ Gs and every variable x in the domain of σe there exists t ∈
Sub(P ) ∪AI and a leaf e
′ ∈ G1 ∪ · · · ∪ Gs such that t vσ
e′
σe(x).
Proof. Since P satisfies κ = ((C1, C
′
1), . . . , (Cs, C
′
s)), there exists a state q ∈ GP and q-strategy
graphs G1, . . . ,Gs which satisfy (C1, C
′
1), . . . , (Cs, C
′
s), respectively.
The first statement is clear for secure channel and ε-transitions, since this is even satisfied in
GP , and thus, in particular for every G
i since they are subgraphs of GP .
As for intruder transitions, first observe that if in a q-strategy graph which satisfies (C,C ′), say,
there exists a node with at least two outgoing intruder edges with different labels (i.e., differing
messages or principal names), say one of the labels is λ, then if all transitions with label other
than λ are removed, the resulting graph (consisting only of states reachable from q) will still be a
q-strategy graph and will still satisfy (C,C ′). Hence, we may assume that for every state in G i all
outgoing intruder transitions have the same label. This means that in all intruder transitions the
same message is sent to the same principal. Now, the number of different edges originating from
the root of this principal is bounded by the size of P . Moreover, applying the same principal rule
(on the same edge of the principal) to the same message, yields the same resulting state. Thus, in
effect, the number of outgoing intruder transitions is bounded by the size of P .
In summary, we may assume that the q-strategy graphs G i satisfy property 1. This property
implies that the number of outgoing transitions (of any kind) of every state of a strategy graph G i
is polynomially bounded in the size of P . Since the length of the longest path in GP , and thus G
i, is
also bounded by the size of P , we obtain that the number of leaves of G i is bounded exponentially
in P .
Now, if for these strategy graphs property 2. is not satisfied, we can repeatedly apply Lemma 10
until property 2. is satisfied. Note that since the number of leaves in the strategy graphs G i is
exponentially bounded in the size of P , Lemma 10 only needs to be applied a finite number of
times. Also, observe that the transformation of the graphs and the state q performed in Lemma 10
preserve property 1. 2
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Based on Lemma 11, we can now define an algorithm which decides Strategy. We will first
consider the case that the strategy property is of the form ((C,C ′)). As we will see, it is easy to
extend this to the more general case ((C1, C
′
1), . . . , (Cs, C
′
s)).
By (the proof of) Lemma 11, we know that the number of leaves of (the union of) the strategy
graphs can be bounded exponentially in the size of the protocol and the strategy property. With
this, property 2. of Lemma 11 guarantees that the DAG size of the family of substitutions at the
leaves of the strategy graphs can be bounded by an exponential in the size of the protocol and the
strategy property.
Given ((C,C ′)), our algorithm works as follows: In a nutshell, the algorithm first guesses a path
to some symbolic state and from there it guesses a symbolic graph. Then, it guesses a substitution,
and finally, based on this subsitution, checks whether the symbolic state can in fact be reached,
whether the graph is in fact a strategy graph, and whether the strategy property is satisfied. More
precisely, the algorithm performs the following steps:
1. The algorithm guesses a symbolic path—just as the algorithm for the reachability problem
(Section B.3)—from the root of GP to some symbolic state qs. While constructing the path,
the algorithm decides non-deterministically when to stop.
2. Starting from qs, the algorithm now guesses zero, one, or more symbolic outgoing transitions,
where every symbolic transition is constructed just as in the case of constructing symbolic
paths. By Lemma 11, we know that the number of outgoing transistions of one type can
be bounded by the size of P . At the newly generated symbolic states (if any) the algorithm
proceeds in the same way (by processing each of these states one at a time). If no new
and unprocessed symbolic states are left, this phase of the algorithm stops. The symbolic
structure constructed by the algorithm thus far is considered a tree. The number of leaves of
this tree is exponentially bounded in the size of P and the given strategy graph property.
3. For every leaf of the symbolic tree the algorithm guesses a substitution where the domain of
the substitution is the set of variables occurring on the path in the tree to this leaf starting
from the root of the symbolic tree (which coincides with the root of GP ). This family of
subsitutions is represented as a DAG. As mentioned above, we know that the size of this
DAG can be bounded exponentially in the size of P and the strategy properties. When
applying the substitutions we obtain a graph which we call G. To obtain this graph, we
may need to merge some of the states and transitions of the tree since after applying the
substitution some symbolic states and transitions may coincide. We call the state obtained
when applying the corresponding substitution to a symbolic state, the instance of this state.
4. The algorithm now checks whether the path from the initial state of G (which is also the
initial state of GP ) to the instance of qs is in fact a path in GP and that the paths in G
starting from the instance of qs to the leaves of G are in fact paths in GP . This is done as in
the case of the algorithm for the reachability problem. If this check is successful, it follows
that G is a subgraph of GP .
5. The algorithm checks whether the subgraph G ′ of G rooted at the instance of qs is in fact
a strategy graph by checking for every state of G ′ the required conditions. It is easy to see
that this can be decided for every such state. The argument is similar to the one for checking
reachability property.
6. Check whether G ′ satisfies (C,C ′). This is decided as in the case of the reachability property.
With Lemma 11, it is easy to see that this algorithm decides whether P satisfies the strategy




s), . . . , (Cs, C
′
s)) as follows: Step 1. is exactly the as above. In step 2. , the algorithm
does esstentially the same as above. However, the number of outgoing transitions of one kind at
one symbolic state may be s times the size of P since the structure guessed by the algorithm is
meant to represent (symbolic versions of) the union of s strategy graphs. To be able to extract
the different graphs, colors 1, . . . , s are assigned to the states. States may have several colors. The
state qs has all colors. The colors are assigned in such a way that if a symbolic state (except qs) is
assigned a certain color, then the preceeding state has been assigned this color as well. Step 3. is
unchanged. If to construct G states have to be merged, the union of the corresponding sets of colors
is taken. Step 4. stays the same as well. Step 5. is performed on every subgraph of G ′ induced by
a certain color. Step 6. is again done for every subgraph of G ′ induced by a certain color. Using
Lemma 11, it easily follows that this algorithm decides Strategy. Hence, we obtain Theorem 3.
A complexity analysis of this algorithm reveals that the algorithms runs in at most deterministic
double exponential time. We note that if we consider a rooted version of the strategy problem, i.e.,
a version where q is given, the problem can be shown to be PSPACE-hard by a straightforward
reduction from QBF.
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